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ABSTRACT
The Development of British Competition Law:
A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization
by Jeremy Lever
The paper analyses the development of competition law in the United Kingdom by
reference to four separate regimes, each with its own rules, scope of application and
mode of application, though to some extent overlapping:
(1)  the common law doctrine of restraint of trade (affecting, primarily in practice,
restrictions on the activities of employees after the ending of their employment and
of vendors of businesses after completion of the sale);
(2)  the monopolies and mergers legislation (creating a body of administrative law and
practice, with eventual power vested in the government to remedy public interest
detriments resulting from a wide range of monopolistic situations and ant-
competitive practices as well as to prohibit such mergers as still fall within the
competence of national authorities within the EU);
(3)  the restrictive trade practices and resale price maintenance legislation (creating a
legal, court-based system for prohibiting defined categories of restrictive trading
agreements and resale price maintenance, subject to exemptions granted by the
specialist court established by the legislation);
(4)  the rules on competition of the European Communities (primarily Articles 85 and
86 of the EC Treaty which prohibit respectively anti-competitive agreements etc.,
subject to exemption by the EC Commission, and abuse of a dominant position by
one or more undertakings; and, since 1989, the EC Merger Control Regulation
governing all concentrations having a Community dimension.
Finally the paper discusses the impact of the UK Competition Act 1998 which modifies
(2) above and substantially sweeps away (3) above, creating new rules which will bring
UK competition law and practice broadly into line with EC competition law.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Entwicklung des britischen Wettbewerbsrechts: eine Generalüberholung und
Harmonisierung
In diesem Beitrag wird die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts im Vereinigten König-
reich analysiert. Dabei werden vier verschiedene Regelwerke (Regime) unterschieden,
jedes mit eigenen Regeln, einem eigenen Anwendungsbereich und Anwendungsmodus,
obwohl sich diese Regelwerke in manchen Aspekten überschneiden:
(1)  die Common Law-Doktrin der Handelsbeschränkung (betrifft in der Praxis primär
die Einschränkung von Aktivitäten der Beschäftigten nach Beendigung eines
Arbeitsverhältnisses und die der Verkäufer nach Abschluß des Verkaufs);
(2)  die Monopol- und Fusionsgesetzgebung (schafft ein System administrativer Vor-
schriften und Verfahren mit Eingriffsmöglichkeiten seitens der Regierung, um das
öffentliche Interesse schädigende Folgen einer weiten Spanne monopolistischer und
Antiwettbewerbspraktiken zu korrigieren; dazu gehört auch das Verbot von Unter-
nehmenszusammenschlüssen, wenn es innerhalb der national zuständigen Wettbe-
werbsbehörden liegt);
(3)  die Gesetzgebung zu Handelsbeschränkungen und zur Preisbindung der zweiten
Hand (schafft ein legales, gerichtsgestütztes System zum Verbot bestimmter
restriktiver Handelsvereinbarungen und Vereinbarungen zur Preisbindung der
zweiten Hand. Über Ausnahmen kann von einem durch die Gesetzgebung
eingerichteten Gericht entschieden werden);
(4)  die Wettbewerbsregeln der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (hauptsächlich Artikel 85
und 86 des EWG-Vertrages. Diese verbieten einerseits wettbewerbsbeschränkende
Vereinbarungen etc., wobei Ausnahmen durch die Europäische Kommission erteilt
werden können, sowie andererseits den Mißbrauch einer dominanten Stellung durch
ein oder mehrere Unternehmen. Daneben gibt es seit 1989 die Europäische Fusions-
kontroll-Verordnung, die Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse mit einer europäischen
Dimension betrifft).
Schließlich wird in dem Beitrag der Einfluß des britischen Wettbewerbsgesetzes von
1998 erörtert, das die unter (2) genannten Regelungen modifiziert und substantiell den
unter (3) genannten Bereich ändert, indem neue Regeln festgelegt werden, die das
britische Wettbewerbsrecht und seine Praxis in breite Übereinstimmung mit dem EU-
Wettbewerbsrecht bringen.
The Development of British Competition Law:
A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization
by Jeremy Lever Q.C.
Introduction
By the 1980s, if one includes the old judge-made rules concerning the legal
enforceability of contracts that restrict competition, there were in the United
Kingdom four distinct legal régimes that were concerned with monopolistic or anti-
competitive situations and conduct. Each of those régimes had its own more or less
complex rules and each régime covered a range of different situations. There was
some overlapping in the application of the rules as between one régime and another;
but the rules, the concepts underlying them and the applicable procedures were
wholly different as between the different régimes. By the late 1980s it was widely
recognised that, in consequence, the law was in a most unsatisfactory state,
particularly because competition law should be reasonably understandable by
businessmen whose conduct it is intended to regulate.
From time to time between 1989 and 1997 the Conservative Government appeared
to be about to introduce amending legislation. But, for whatever reason, it did not do
so. When, therefore, in 1997, shortly after its election, the new Labour Government
proposed such legislation as part of its initial legislative programme, the move was
widely welcomed.
2The new legislation, the Competition Act 1998, was finally passed by Parliament
late last year, though for the most part its provisions will not come into force until
early in 2000. The Act goes a long way towards bringing UK competition law into
line with European Community competition law. Although two of the other, older,
legal régimes still exist, one of those two (the old, judge-made rules relating to the
legal enforceability of contracts that restrict competition) is now of limited economic
significance; and the scope of the remaining régime has been reduced by the new
legislation, is likely to be used by the UK competition authorities more sparingly in
the future in so far as the new EC law-based régime can more  appropriately be
applied and is likely in the future to be applied in practice increasingly along the
same lines as parallel rules of EC law.
I. The Common Law
Until 1948 the United Kingdoms competition law was provided exclusively by the
common law, that is to say judge-made case law. During the 18th and 19th Centuries
the judges developed what came to be called the common law doctrine of undue
restraint of trade. Indeed, on the other side of the Atlantic, the common law doctrine
was a source of inspiration of the US Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The doctrine
still remains part of UK law.
The primary application of the doctrine has always been to 
- contracts of employment and partnership contracts that impose
restrictions on the activities in which the employees and partners may
engage after the termination of their employment or partnership
relationship; and
- contracts for the sale of a business that impose restrictions on the
activities in which the seller may engage after the transfer has been
completed.
But the doctrine is also applicable to other contractually imposed restrictions on
competition such as 
3- cartels and
- solus petrol ties.
Unless such contractual restrictions are reasonable in the interests of the parties and
are not unreasonable in the public interest, they are not enforceable in legal
proceedings. Hence, the period for which and geographical area within which a
restriction operates and the kind of activities to which it applies must all be shown to
be no more than reasonably related to the legitimate business interests of the person
in whose favour the restriction operates or the restriction will be unenforceable by
legal proceedings.
The sole legal sanction provided by the doctrine is the unenforceability of
unreasonable restrictions. The consensual operation of such restrictions by the
parties is not, as such, unlawful either as a crime or as a tort (an unerlaubte
Handlung) so the doctrine provides no legal remedy for third parties who suffer loss
as a result of the operation of restrictions, however unreasonable they may be.
The contractual unenforceability of covenants [contractual undertakings] in undue
restraint of trade reflects a laisser faire philosophy subject to the provision of a
reasonable degree of protection for the legitimate commercial interests of employers,
buyers of businesses and so on. The absence of positive legal remedies for third
parties injured as a result of the operation of such restraints reflects the
unwillingness of the judiciary to become involved in disputes about the economic
rights and wrongs of restrictions of competition and the related social and political
issues: the training and experience of the judges simply did not equip them to decide
such disputes.
Because of the development in the second half of the 20th Century in the United
Kingdom of statute-based competition law, the practical importance of the common
law doctrine is now largely confined to the traditional areas of its primary
application  contracts of employment and the like and contracts for the sale of a
business. However, the doctrine retains an importance, especially for individuals and
4small firms, precisely because the restrictions of competition to which the doctrine
applies are often of so little overall economic importance that, for that reason, more
modern competition law may often not apply to them.
At the same time, the common law doctrine did not and does not in itself provide an
adequate basis for a modern competition law. In particular: -
- the doctrine does not apply to abuse of economic power as such; it applies
only to cases where restrictions have been accepted under agreements
between the parties;
- the application of the common law doctrine depends entirely on the parties
to the relevant agreement invoking it;
- the only sanction provided by the doctrine is unenforceability of offending
contractual terms.
II. The monopolies and mergers legislation
The first UK legislation
The common law doctrine of restraint of trade, together with its severe limitations,
forms part of the legal background to the enactment by the UK Parliament of the
UKs first competition law statute, namely the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
(Inquiry and Control) Act 1948.
The factual background to the legislation includes substantial cartellization of
British industry as a result of the Great Depression of the 1930s and War-time
governmental price control which in practice established minimum as well as
maximum prices and was generally based on costings supplied by trade associations
which were therefore accustomed to participating in a centralised price-setting
process. In those circumstances it would have been unthinkable for any British
Government in 1948 to have introduced legislation modelled on the US Sherman
Antitrust Act with its criminal and civil sanctions against agreements in undue
restraint of trade.
5Moreover, the Post-War British Labour Government was in any event by no means
wedded to the ideas of promotion of competition and the free play of market forces.
On the contrary, it was a Socialist Government that was dedicated to ultimately
bringing into State ownership, as monopolies, all parts of the British economy. The
1948 legislation was therefore, I believe, primarily directed at controlling potentially
 perhaps presumptively  wicked capitalists in the large parts of the economy that
were still in the private sector and therefore not directly controllable by the State as
owner.
The scheme of the 1948 Act was to leave both the power of initiative and the power
of eventual action in the hands of a Government Minister but to establish an
administrative body to investigate and to report on the situations referred to it by the
Government Minister and, in particular, to report on whether those situations, or
conduct related to them, operated against the public interest.
Over the years the title of the responsible Minister has changed and, for simplicity, I
shall refer to that Minister as the Minister of Economics, even though no such title
exists in the United Kingdom. Similarly, the name of the administrative body has
changed, in fact twice, since 1948 and, for simplicity, I shall sometimes refer to that
body by its title in 1998, namely the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (or
MMC) even though it was not until 1965 that mergers were brought within the scope
of the legislation, with a consequential re-naming of the Commission so as to refer to
Mergers in its title.
Initially the matters that were capable of being referred to the new Commission were
in some respects very extensive and in other respects rather limited. Important
limitations were that initially only situations concerning the supply or acquisition of
goods, not services, could be referred to the Commission and, as I have already
mentioned, mergers as such were not referable to it.
Passing to what could be referred, the first kind of situation subsequently came to be
called a scale monopoly: in any case where it appeared to the Minister of
6Economics that an undertaking (including a group of companies under common
control) supplied one-third or more of goods of a particular description in the United
Kingdom or in a substantial part of the United Kingdom, the Minister could refer the
situation to the Commission for investigation and report. In 1973 the figure of one-
third was reduced by subsequent legislation to one-quarter, where it remains. But
whether at one-third or one-quarter, such a share of the supply of goods of a
particular description does not itself necessarily imply the possession of economic
power, let alone dominance or monopoly power: a third or a quarter is not a very
high share even if the particular description of goods corresponds with a relevant
market; and in fact the relevant market may be wider because of demand
substitutability, supply substitutability or both demand and supply substitutability.
Thus, the scale monopoly provisions were and are to be seen as merely creating
jurisdiction without, in themselves, implying anything about economic power, let
alone misuse of economic power.
The second kind of situation that was made referable to the new Commission came
to be called a complex monopoly situation. Such a situation exists where one-third or
more (now one-quarter or more) of goods of a particular description are supplied by
different suppliers who, however, whether by agreement or not, so conduct their
respective affairs as to prevent, restrict or distort competition (the word distort was
introduced by subsequent legislation in 1973, no doubt reflecting the influence of the
competition law of the European Economic Community which the United Kingdom
joined on 1 January 1973). Initially, and obviously, this covered cartels provided that
they satisfied the one-third share condition; but, as we shall see, most horizontal
restrictive trading agreements, and in particular cartels, were subsequently taken out
of the body of law established by the 1948 Act and were made subject to a different
legal régime. Complex monopoly situations were thereafter substantially confined to
cases where a number of suppliers, none of whom might have a particularly large
market share, had restrictive arrangements with their customers or with their
suppliers  e.g. solus arrangements between oil companies and petrol stations, tied
7house arrangements between brewers and public houses  or where the suppliers
operated selective or exclusive distribution policies.
The 1948 Act contained, and the current legislation that has replaced it contains,
provisions parallel to those described above, covering 
- acquisition, as opposed to supply, of goods;
- situations where goods of a particular description are not supplied at all in the
United Kingdom or in a substantial part of the United Kingdom and
- exportation of goods from the United Kingdom, including therefore export
cartels.
The extension of the legislation in 1965 to cover services and mergers
In 1965 services were assimilated to goods for the purposes of the legislation (but
agreements and arrangements operating in the area of employment of labour
continued to be wholly excluded from consideration)1; and, at the same time,
mergers were added to the situations that were referable to what had by then become
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission  both prospective mergers and, if
referred promptly after they had taken place, completed mergers. Newspaper
mergers were made subject to special provisions; and that continues to be so. In
1980 a further category of situations was made referable to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission, namely anti-competitive practices, to which I will come back
later in this lecture.
The establishment in 1973 of the Office of Fair Trading
Under the 1948 Act references to the Commission could be made only by the
Minister of Economics but after 1973 the Director General of Fair Trading, the head
                                                          
1 However, section 79 of the Fair Trading Act 1973 (see above) empowers the Minister of Economics
to refer to the MMC restrictive labour practices i.e. practices whereby, with certain exceptions,
restrictions or other requirements (not relating exclusively to rates of remuneration) operate in
relation to the employment of, or work done by, workers: on such a reference, the MMC is required
to disregard any conduct that takes place in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute.
8of a newly established, independent competition and fair trading agency (the Office
of Fair Trading), was also given the power to make references, except for references
of mergers and in a few other special cases, and in practice since 1973 references
other than merger references have been made by the Director General of Fair
Trading.
The composition of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
The Commission has always had a full time Chairman, until recently always a
lawyer but now an economist; for some time past it has had several more or less full
time Deputy Chairmen. Apart from that, the members of the Commission, who are
drawn from industry, commerce, the trade unions, the professions and academic life,
are all part-time. The Commission sits in Panels (or Chambers as they might be
called in Germany save that membership of a Panel is established case by case). The
Panels are supported by a full time staff of economists, accountants, lawyers and so
on who do a great deal of the actual work.
In the early years of the life of the Commission the references to it were principally
of old fashioned cartels and monopolies. As I explain later in this lecture, that early
work of the Commission contributed to the hiving off of cartels and many other
restrictive trading arrangements into a new and different legal régime so that they
ceased to be referred to the Commission.
The definition of the public interest
The 1948 Act contained an open-ended definition of the public interest: it stated that:
...all matters which appear in the particular circumstances to be relevant shall be
taken into account and, amongst other things, regard shall be had to the need,
consistently with the general economic position of the United Kingdom, to achieve 
(a) the production, treatment and distribution by the most efficient and
economical means of goods of such types and qualities, in such volume and at
such prices as will best meet the requirements of home and overseas markets;
9(b) the organisation of industry and trade in such a way that their efficiency is
progressively increased and new enterprise is encouraged;
(c) the fullest use and best distribution of men, materials and industrial capacity
in the United Kingdom; and
(d) the development of technical improvements and the expansion of existing
markets and the opening up of new markets.
No mention was made of the desirability of competition as such. When in 1965,
mergers were brought within the scope of the legislation, the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission was simply told by the legislation that, in considering the
public interest, it was to take into account all matters which appear in the particular
circumstances to be relevant, though the Ministry of Economics was given power to
give specific directions as to matters to which the Commission was to have regard in
this connection (in fact the Ministry never gave any such directions).
The Fair Trading Act 1973
In 1973, on the initiative of by then a Conservative Government, Parliament repealed
the 1948 and 1965 legislation and replaced it with up-dated provisions which
included the creation of the new independent Office of Fair Trading, with extensive
powers in the field of competition law. However the 1973 legislation, called the Fair
Trading Act 1973, did not basically affect the work of the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission, subject to the fact that, just as in 1956 cartels and most other restrictive
agreements relating to goods had become subject to a different regime which I shall
in due course describe and in which the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was
not concerned, the Fair Trading Act made provision for the transfer to that other
regime of cartels and restrictive agreements relating to services  a transfer that was
actually effected in 1976. The Fair Trading Act 1973 also enumerated a new, though
still non-exhaustive, list of matters to which, in assessing the public interest, for all
purposes, including merger references, the Commission was to have particular
regard. A majority, but not all, of the listed matters were concerned directly or
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indirectly with the desirability of competition which, for the first time, was expressly
mentioned.
The operation of the Commission in practice
At least in part because of the absence of any clear statement by Parliament of how
the Commission was to approach its task, the Commission, in its approach to any
particular reference, was greatly influenced by the politico-economic climate that
was prevalent at the time of the reference. Thus, between 1960 and the early 1980s
there were substantial periods when the old, socialist, Labour Party was in power.
The Labour Government of that period attempted to grapple with the perennial
problems of inflation, sluggish economic growth and a balance of payments deficit
by national plans and agreements with the trade unions, which were almost an arm of
government, and by governmental control of prices and wages.
In that climate the Monopolies and Mergers Commission tended to concentrate
excessively on the profitability of the scale monopolists that the Commission
investigated. The unfortunate consequences of that approach were compounded by
the rapid inflation that occurred for much of the period which resulted in an
overstatement of true profitability in companies accounts, which generally used
Historical Cost Accounting conventions. At times the MMC almost resembled a
Price Control Commission.
In merger references, because of the ascendancy of the trade unions, it was
extremely dangerous for the parties to draw attention to the scope for shedding
labour that the merger would provide; on the contrary, parties to mergers used to
assure the trade unions concerned and the MMC that the merger would not result in
any redundancies or at least any involuntary redundancies  even though British
industry was grossly in need of restructuring to improve productivity per employee.
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Three phases in the work of the Commission
If we review the work of the MMC up to the enactment of the Competition Act
1998, which restructured UK competition law, we can divide it into three periods.
First, between the establishment of the Commission in 1948 and the passing of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 1956, the Commission did valuable work in
investigating the old fashioned cartels, the restrictive arrangements operated by
monopolies and the collective enforcement of resale price maintenance that were
referred to it. That work contributed to the establishment of a more rigorous separate
régime for defined classes of restrictive arrangements.
There then followed nearly a quarter of a century during which much of the MMCs
work, lacking clear major premises, was unfocused and impressionistic. At least in
part because of the lack of focus of the legislation itself, almost anything that a scale
monopolist did or that a merged undertaking might do was liable to be questioned
and condemned on the ground that it might have an adverse impact on some aspect
of the public interest in its widest sense. And this despite the fact that a body in the
position of the MMC was at least almost as likely to get the answer wrong as it was
to get it right if it cast its net so widely. This is not to criticise the members of the
Commission personally. The Commissions procedures were impeccably fair, those
who were investigated were treated with the greatest courtesy and the members of
the Commission and their staff conscientiously studied their papers and maintained
the highest standards of integrity. If one had an objective criticism at the personal
level, it would be that the Commission lacked a sufficient core of members with a
sound grounding in the by then well developed legal and economic theories that
ought to underpin any system of competition law. Particularly because of that fact,
the vagueness of the UK legislation in relation to the definition of the public interest
and the corporatist, interventionist political climate within which the Commission
operated for much of this second period combined to lead to over-wide
investigations and the elevation of ad hoc judgements on what were called the merits
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of the individual case over the consistent and explicit application of any principles,
let alone principles of competition law.
In the third and last period the position has improved. The improvement was initially
attributable, at least in part, to the establishment of Thatcherism with its emphasis
on free market forces. Specifically in the field of mergers in particular, Thatcherism
found expression in the announcement by the then Minister of Economics, Mr.
Norman Tebbitt, that henceforth mergers would ordinarily be referred to the MMC
only if they appeared to threaten effective competition. Although the Tebbitt
doctrine formally related to the grounds on which mergers would be referred to the
MMC and not to the criteria by reference to which the MMC was to judge them,
which continued to be governed by the same legislative provisions as before, in
practice the doctrine influenced the MMC to focus increasingly on the impact, if any,
that a merger might be expected to have on competition. That trend was, in turn,
reinforced by the adoption by the European Community Council in 1988 of a Merger
Control Regulation which transferred to the EC Commission jurisdiction over all
large mergers unless within the EC the merging parties operated to a substantial
degree only in one and the same Member State. Under the Merger Control
Regulation the EC Commission can block a merger only if it would create or
strengthen a dominant position and thereby impede effective competition in the
Common Market. After the coming into operation of the Merger Control Regulation
it was obvious that it would be anomalous for the MMC to recommend that a
relatively small merger should be blocked in circumstances in which, if the merger
had been larger and more significant and therefore subject to control at the European
Community level, it would necessarily have been permitted to proceed.
Another development that happened near the beginning of this third period in the
development of the work of the MMC should be mentioned here. In 1980 Parliament
enacted a further piece of legislation which enlarged the scope of the MMCs work.
That legislation created a new concept  the so-called anti-competitive practice.
Even in the absence of scale monopoly or complex monopoly, an anti-competitive
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practice in which any undertaking above a minimum size engaged might be
investigated by the Director General of Fair Trading; if he found that the practice did
constitute an anti-competitive practice, as defined by the legislation, the matter
would automatically be referred to the MMC if the undertaking concerned rejected
the Director Generals finding that its conduct constituted an anti-competitive
practice or contended that in any event the practice was not against the public
interest. That was clearly an unsatisfactorily ad hoc system but it may at least have
reinforced the emerging competitionist approach of the MMC.
Finally, this last period of the operation of the MMC saw the appointment of first
one and then, after an interval, another Chairman of the MMC with a greater interest
in the legal and economic principles underlying competition law as it exists outside
the United Kingdom. Indeed the present Chairman, the first economist to hold the
post, had done a great deal of work in the field as an economic consultant and expert
before becoming a member of the MMC.
A weakness of the régime established by the legislation
A weakness of the whole of the régime that I have been describing has always been
and remains that until 
- a particular situation has been referred to the MMC,
- the MMC has investigated it and reported that it or conduct related to it
operates or may be expected to operate against the public interest and
- the authorities have then obtained satisfactory undertakings from the parties
or, in the absence of such undertakings, have made orders governing their
future conduct,
the régime provides neither public law nor private law remedies to the authorities or
to injured third parties in respect of the situation or conduct in question even if it is
of a kind that has previously been condemned in other cases; and even after the
process that has been described above has been completed, the régime provides
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remedies only in respect of the situation or conduct that has been prohibited in so far
as it continues thereafter. This is subject only to the possibility of the authorities
making interim orders to prevent the consummation of mergers before they have
been investigated and cleared.
I will come back to the future of the MMC after reviewing the two other competition
law régimes that were operative alongside the common law and the monopolies ad
mergers legislation by the 1980s and 1990s.
III. The restrictive trade practices and resale price maintenance legislation
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956
The first of those other régimes was initially established by the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act 1956. That Act was introduced by a Conservative Government that
adopted a competitionist industrial policy as an explicit alternative to the Labour
Partys policy of bringing the British economy increasingly into State ownership
and, so far as practicable, exercising State control over almost  all aspects of
economic activity. By 1956 the work of the Commission established by the 1948 Act
had made it clear that British industry was still widely cartellized, with damaging
results for consumers and the economy generally, and that dealing with cartels by
referring them, one by one, to the Commission, which in any event worked rather
slowly, would take far too long. The Conservative Government of the day also had
an ideological objection, not to resale price maintenance, or rpm, as such but to its
collective enforcement which, for legal reasons was the only way in which a supplier
could enforce his rpm conditions against a price-cutter who, as was usually the case,
had acquired the suppliers goods  through an intermediary. Collective enforcement
of rpm conditions involved the use of private tribunals to determine whether a
distributor had been guilty of price-cutting in breach of a suppliers rpm conditions
and, if so, whether a boycott or some lesser penalty such as a fine should be
imposed on the price-cutter. Such a system of private courts and fines offended
against the rule of lower case which the Conservative Party was dedicated to
upholding  not least for its significance in controlling the exercise of power by the
15
trade unions. Consistency required that the rule of law should also apply to
arrangements made by industrialists.
Part I of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 was concerned with the control of
a broadly but precisely defined category of restrictive arrangements relating to
goods. Part II of the Act was concerned with the enforcement of rpm conditions.
Thus Part I of the Act created in the first place a category of arrangements that were
required to be notified to a governmental agency which entered particulars of them
on a public register and would then in due course refer each of the notified
agreements to a newly established Court, the Restrictive Practices Court, which was
presided over by a High Court judge and had its courtroom in the Royal Courts of
Justice.
The arrangements to which Part I of the 1956 Act applied included not only
agreements that were intended to be legally enforceable but also informal
arrangements that created feelings of mutual obligation as between the parties, even
in the absence of legal obligation. The arrangements also included recommendations
by trade associations.
The principal characteristics of the arrangements to which Part I of the 1956 Act
applied were 
- first, that two or more of the parties carried on business in the production or
supply of goods in the United Kingdom, and
- secondly, that two or more of the parties accepted restrictions of one or more
specified kinds relating to the production, supply,  processing, or acquisition
of goods.
Thus international cartels to which there was only one British party, perhaps a
monopolist in the UK, and agreements under which only one party was subject to a
restriction fell outside the scope of Part I of the Act which also expressly excluded
pure export cartels and many kinds of bilateral vertical agreements, though such
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situations continued to be referable to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
under the regine that I have described.
Extension of the legislation to information agreements and services
Over the years, as a result of subsequent legislation, in 1976 agreements relating to
services were also brought within the scope of the Act, as too, largely in 1969, were
certain information agreements, only some information agreements having been
covered by the original Act; on the other hand, over the years a substantial number
of additional specific exemptions were provided by various Acts of Parliament. Also,
as a result of subsequent legislation, in 1968 operation of an arrangement to which
Part I of the Act applied became unenforceable as between the parties and a civil
wrong (eine unerlaubte Handlung) if the arrangement had not been duly notified in
accordance with the Act; and public law and private law remedies were made
available for use in such cases.
Once an agreement had been notified, whether voluntarily or as a result of an
investigation by the responsible official  from 1973 onwards, the Director General
of Fair Trading  he would refer it to the Restrictive Practices Court unless he and
the Minister of Economics agreed that it was too insignificant for that to be required.
The Restrictive Practices Court
The Restrictive Practices Court operates a typical U.K.-style adversary court
procedure including the advocates wearing wigs and court dress and gowns  wholly
unlike the informal non-adversarial procedure of the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission.
The public interest: the gateways and the tailpiece
In the Restrictive Practices Court the parties to the referred arrangements bear the
burden of proving, by evidence and argument, that the restrictions contained in their
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arrangements do not operate against the public interest. To establish that that is so,
the parties have to do two things:
- first, they have to pass through one or more specified gateways: e.g. that the
restrictions confer a specific and substantial benefit on purchasers, consumers
or users or that the operation of the restrictions substantially relieves what
would otherwise be long-term regional unemployment, or that the restrictions
materially contribute to UK exports, or that the restrictions are required to
counter the exercise of economic power by a third party and so on, or, as a
result of subsequent legislation, that the restrictions do not materially prevent,
restrict or distort competition in any market;
- secondly, the parties have to satisfy a condition called the tailpiece which
they can do by establishing that the restrictions are not unreasonable having
regard to the balance between what has been proved for the purpose of
getting through one or more of the gateways and any detriments suffered by
persons not parties to the agreement (purchasers, users or consumers of the
products covered by the agreement and, also, competitors and would-be
competitors) as a result of the operation of the restrictions.
Unless the parties get through one or more gateways and the tailpiece condition is
satisfied, the Court prohibits the parties from continuing to operate the referred
arrangements and from operating any other arrangements to the like effect. Breach of
such an order attracts quasi-criminal sanctions.
The operation of the legislation
Part I of the 1956 Act led to a substantial number of cases before the Restrictive
Practices Court in which the parties to arrangements to which Part I applied sought
to justify those arrangements. Most of the cases concerned horizontal price - fixing
agreements and, in the absence of very special circumstances, the attempts to justify
them generally failed. A case that did not concern horizontal price - fixing merits
special mention here; it concerned an agreement between book publishers that
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enabled, but did not oblige, them individually to establish effective minimum resale
prices for books that they published and to do so on terms that provided for
reasonable, common, exceptions. The publishers successful defence of their
agreement contributed to the subsequent legislative treatment of resale price
maintenance.
However, by about 1970 attempts at justification more or less ceased and the
Restrictive Practices Court was only rarely assembled  and then generally to hear
cases where it was alleged that a party or parties had broken an earlier Court order (a
quasi-criminal contempt of court) or had unlawfully operated a notifiable
agreement without having duly notified it. However, the Court is currently hearing
its last case which concerns agreements between the Association Football Premier
League with on the one hand B Sky B and on the other hand the BBC. The case
raises issues about the whole future of the organisation of English football and
admirably illustrates the unsuitability of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act and the
court-room procedures that it involves for dealing with complex economic issues of
the kind that the case raises.
The Restrictive Trade Practices legislation served a valuable purpose in the 1950s
and 1960s in educating businessmen, especially in the large corporations, that cartels
were no longer acceptable. But in the longer run the legislation turned out to be a
dead-end: especially as the legislation was extended to services and information
agreements and new, ad hoc statutory exceptions were created, what was even from
the outset drafted in technical and legalistic terms became ever more obscure even to
non-specialist lawyers and certainly to the average businessman.
The Restrictive Trade Practices legislation will shortly cease to have effect and one
cannot regret its imminent demise: an agreement might have no economic
significance yet fall within the terms of the legislation; unless the parties were
properly advised by a lawyer who had the legislation in mind, the parties might then
fail duly to notify it; the terms of the agreement that constituted relevant restrictions
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were then in many cases irretrievably void so that either or both of the parties were
then able to avoid contractual obligations that they had undertaken in good faith.
Even in terms of deterring the making of obviously unjustifiable cartel agreements,
the application of the legislation became highly anomalous. In effect an undertaking
was allowed its first bite free of public law remedies; any second or subsequent bite
then exposed the undertaking to draconian, quasi-criminal sanctions. Undertakings,
which perhaps 40 years ago had abandoned an old cartel agreement when it was
referred to the Restrictive Practices Court, would then have been subjected by the
Court to prohibition orders. Thereafter a quasi-criminal public law régime applied to
those undertakings. By contrast, undertakings none of which happened ever to have
been subjected to a prohibition order might engage in an indefensible cartel for
several years before being detected and subjected to Court orders; no quasi-criminal
sanctions attached to their conduct in the interval.
Resale price maintenance
Before I leave the Restrictive Practices legislation, I need to complete the history of
the treatment of resale price maintenance in the United Kingdom.
You will recall that the Conservative Government in 1956 had ideological (as well
as practical) objections to the collective enforcement of rpm by means of collective
boycotts and the like. Part II of the Restrictive Trade Practice Act 1956 therefore
unconditionally prohibited the collective enforcement of rpm. In return, suppliers
were given a new statutory right to enforce their rpm conditions against price-cutters
irrespective of whether the price-cutters were in direct contractual relations with the
supplier.
However, in 1964 Mr. Heaths relatively competitionist Conservative Government
decided to ban even individual rpm. Because the agreement between publishers that
enabled them to impose effective rpm conditions on books that they published had
been justified before the Restrictive Practices Court under the Restrictive Trade
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Practices Act, the Government felt unable to impose an absolute ban on rpm and
therefore introduced a régime for it that resembled the Restrictive Trade Practices
legislation in that it enabled suppliers to notify the authorities of their desire to
continue to operate rpm for their goods; the authorities would then refer the
description of goods in question to the Restrictive Practices Court and the suppliers
then needed to justify their practice by passing through one or more specific public
interest gateways and satisfying a general tailpiece balancing condition.
Books gained exemption on the basis of the earlier judgment of the Restrictive
Practices Court in the Books case under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act; and the
suppliers of pharmaceutical products successfully defended their practice of rpm. No
other goods were exempted; and today only pharmaceuticals enjoy exemption,
though it is not clear whether that exemption will continue.
IV. The rules on competition of the EC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty
The direct effect of EC competition law in the United Kingdom since 1973
I have now covered the first three of the four régimes of competition law that were
operative in the United Kingdom before the recent reforms and that brings me to the
fourth régime. The fourth régime was provided by the rules on competition of the
EC Treaty which of course still continue to apply as before.
The United Kingdom acceded to the European Communities on 1st January 1973.
The EC rules on competition then became of direct effect in the United Kingdom,
notably Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty, as it was
then called, which took effect in addition to national competition law, and Articles
65 and 66 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, which, so far as coal
and steel Treaty products were concerned, took effect to the exclusion of national
competition law.
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Article 85 of the EC Treaty
Article 85 (1)of what is now the European Community Treaty prohibits agreements
and concerted practices between undertakings and decisions of associations of
undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market and that may affect trade
between Member States. Article 85 (2) provides that such agreements shall be
automatically void. Article 85 (3) provides for the possibility of exemption from the
prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) if certain specified conditions are fulfilled.
The prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) does not apply to an agreement that does
not appreciably affect competition and trade between Member States either because
of the economic insignificance of the agreement and of any network of agreements
of which it forms part or because of the application of a still ill-defined rule of
reason.
Article 86 of the EC Treaty
Article 86 prohibits abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position where
the abuse may affect trade between Member States.
Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty
Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty contain broadly parallel provisions save that
Article 66 established merger control for coal and steel Treaty undertakings from the
outset whereas merger control at Community level of other undertakings was not
established until 1989 when the Council adopted the EECs Merger Control
Regulation (see further below).
EC Regulations in the field of competition law
By the 1980s there were in place a substantial number of Council and EC
Commission Regulations providing for the detailed application of the relevant Treaty
provisions, including 
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- procedural regulations that entrusted the enforcement of the Treaty provisions
as public law primarily to the EC Commission, regulated its procedures and
gave it power to impose potentially large penalties on undertakings that
infringed the rules;
- exempting regulations that create block exemptions from the prohibition
imposed by Article 85 (1) for entire classes of agreements that satisfy
specified conditions and that thus supplement the EC Commissions power to
grant individual exemptions under Article 85 (3).
The rôle of national courts
Only the EC Commission can grant exemptions, whether individual exemptions or,
subject to authorisation by the Council, block exemptions. However, apart from
exemptions, the rules can be applied by the national authorities; and national courts
are bound to give effect to the rules by treating infringing agreements as void and
granting appropriate private law remedies to third parties who have been injured by
infringements.
EC merger control
The Merger Control Regulation gives to the EC Commission exclusive competence
with regard to concentrations having a Community dimension, that is to say control
of all large mergers unless the turnover of each of the merging parties is substantially
concentrated in one and the same Member State or unless, at the request of a
Member State, the EC Commission cedes to that Member State the power to apply
its national competition law in the case of a particular merger which threatens to
create or to strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded on a market within that Member State which
presents all the characteristics of a distinct market. Control is exercisable ex ante.
Mergers can be blocked by the Commission only if they will create or strengthen a
dominant position and will thereby impede effective competition within the
Common Market; and when, exceptionally, the Commission refers a case to a
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Member State, that Member State may take only the measures that are strictly
necessary to safeguard or restore effective competition on the market concerned.
However the Merger Control Regulation preserves the right of Member States to
take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests such as public security,
plurality of the media and operation of prudential rules e.g. relating to the provision
of financial services, if such interests are threatened by a merger. Member States
may also assert exclusive jurisidiction in respect of a merger in so far as it considers
it necessary to do so for the protection of its essential interests in the defence sector.
The differences between the four régimes
Even from the brief descriptions of the four régimes that I have given  the common
law doctrine of restraint of trade, the monopolies and mergers régime, the restrictive
practices and resale price maintenance régime and the EC rules on competition and
mergers, it can be seen that they differ from each other in fundamental respects.
In particular the EC régime lays down ex ante prohibitions, breaches of which
expose the responsible undertaking or undertakings to liability to the imposition of
potentially massive penalties by an administrative body, namely the EC
Commission. By contrast the UK monopolies legislation prohibits nothing ex ante
and relies almost entirely on investigation of individual situations and subsequently
adopted remedies having only prospective effect. Secondly, the EC régime
concentrates on economic effects on competition; by contrast the UK monopolies
and mergers legislation adopts an open-ended definition of the public interest; and
the application of the restrictive trade practices régime depends on technical rules
relating to legal form rather than economic effect.
The need for reform of UK competition law
By the late 1980s informed opinion in the United Kingdom was unanimous in
advocating radical reform of UK national competition law. The general view was
that since, for better or worse, EC competition law had direct effect in the United
Kingdom and businessmen therefore necessarily ought to understand at least the
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broad outlines of EC competition law, UK national law had better be modelled on
the EC rules.
However, there was widespread dissatisfaction in the United Kingdom, as in other
Member States, with the EC Commissions procedures.
Despite the general recognition of the need for reform of UK national competition
law, the Conservative Government failed to bring forward amending legislation and
it was left to the new Labour Government, which was elected in May 1997, to do so.
The Competition Bill was one of the first pieces of legislation that new Labour
introduced and in November 1998 the Bill became law as the Competition Act 1998.
The Competition Act 1998
The principal reforms effected by the 1998 Act are 
- it creates two prohibitions, called the Chapter 1 prohibition and the Chapter 2
prohibition, which are very closely modelled on Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, but without a requirement that the prohibited conduct should have any
effect on trade between Member States;
- in relation to the administration and enforcement of the Chapter 1 and
Chapter 2 prohibitions, it puts the Director General of Fair Trading and the
regulators of the utilities (telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and the
railways) into broadly the same position as that occupied by the EC
Commission in relation to the administration and enforcement of Articles 85
and 86;
- it provides that the new UK law is to be interpreted and applied in accordance
with the case law of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance and with the decisional practice of the EC Commission;
- it repeals the Restrictive Trade Practice Act and the legislation that created
the concept of anti-competitive practice; and it also repeals the specific
legislation relating to resale price maintenance, though it does so in such a
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way as to render resale price maintenance impracticable save, at least
temporarily, for pharmaceuticals;
- it creates a new Competition Commission which will have two distinct
components:
The first of those components will be what is currently the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission; this part of the Competition Commission
will continue to be responsible for investigating and reporting on scale
and complex monopolies and mergers that are referred to it; such
mergers may be mergers that are not of Community dimension,
mergers that are of Community dimension if exceptionally, at the
request of the United Kingdom, the merger has been referred by the
EC Commission to the United Kingdom and, thirdly, any merger that
is referred to it on account of a perceived threat to one of the
recognized legitimate interests of a Member State or for protection of
the essential interest of the United Kingdom in the defence sector.
This part of the  Competition Commission will also continue to deal
with cases where a utilities regulator and a regulated company cannot
agree on the terms of the regulated companys statutory licence.
The second component of the new Competition Commission will be
an Appeal Tribunal which is intended to enjoy full jurisdiction on all
appeals from decisions by the Director General of Fair Trading and the
utilities regulators, taken by them under the Competition Act.
The Appeal Tribunal will have more extensive powers than the EC Court of First
Instance since the Appeal Tribunal will not be confined to annulling appealed
decisions but will be able to exercise the powers of the body that took the appealed
decision if the Appeal Tribunal thinks that a different use of the powers is
appropriate. The procedural rules of the Appeal Tribunal have not yet been  drawn
up but it is greatly to be hoped that they will be much more flexible and much less
technical than typical UK court room procedures.
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The common law doctrine of restraint of trade is wholly unaffected by the 1998 Act.
The possibility of reference to the Competition Commission of scale monopolies and
complex monopolies survives but Ministerial statements in Parliament suggest that
in future the power to make such references will be exercised more sparingly and
largely, if not exclusively, in cases where application of the Chapter 1 and Chapter 2
prohibitions will not provide an adequate remedy for a perceived problem.
Lastly, although the same legislative provisions as before will govern references to
the Competition Commission of mergers that lack Community dimension, it is to be
expected that in practice the Competition Commission will be very slow to
recommend that a merger should be blocked unless either 
- it will create or strengthen a dominant position, if only locally, in the United
Kingdom, and will thereby impede effective competition in the United
Kingdom or
- it will have an adverse impact on a specific aspect of the UK public interest of
a kind recognised by the EC as entitling national authorities to block a merger
 e.g. public security, plurality of the media, stability of the financial system
or national defence.
The Competition Act 1998 has thus gone a long way towards harmonising UK
competition law with EC competition law, partly by adopting an adapted version of
the latter for application in the United Kingdom, partly by repealing the restrictive
practices legislation which was entirely alien to EC law and partly by creating a new
régime which, even where it differs from the EC régime, can be expected to be
operated in a way that provides a compatible complement to EC law. Whilst
experience of the operation of the 1998 Act (or amendment of EC competition law)
may necessitate further amendment of UK competition law, the 1998 Act should
enable the United Kingdom to enter the 21st Century with a far more satisfactory
system of competition law than that which had grown up, rather unsystematically,
over the previous half century.
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